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ABSTRACT: The paper summarizes the contributions of the neoclassical and Austrian school of 
thought in the field of monopoly theory arguing that the first uses non-operational concepts in 
describing  the  entrepreneur’s  actions  on  the  market.  The  Austrian  economic  theory  of  free 
competition is the opposite of perfect and pure competition which is the model used in most of 
policy recommendations and also the intellectual legacy of neoclassicism. After proving that the 
monopoly price can’t be scientifically determined and neither the consumer loss of welfare, the 
paper raises the issue whether public policy should intervene in a case of monopoly. 
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Introduction 
We define as free the market in which the governmental regulations are absent, because only 
that market is free by its very nature. The regulated or corrected market will not be a model for this 
analysis. One of the most disputed subjects on the agenda of any economist specialized in economic 
competition  field or concerning authorities  holding regulating powers, is  monopoly. This  is the 
situation or state of the market in which a firm, after exiting a period of sub competitive prices or 
dumping, eliminates  its competition, achieves the position of  monopoly and then abuses  by  its 
dominant position and raises the price (as a consequence of restricting the output sold) up to a level 
which  will  result  in  losses  for  the  consumer.  (Baumol  &  Blinder,  1979,  pp.  363)  This  is  the 
neoclassical definition of monopoly and will represent the start point for a critique thereof from the 
perspective of the free competition theory which belongs to the intellectual tradition of the Austrian 
school of economics. Moreover, the present paper will try to make a clear distinction between the 
two  market  approaches  by  showing  their  scientific  nature.  There  are  few  aspects  which  need 
clarification before starting the discussion.  
The first and most important aspect is the principle of private property which states that any 
person has property on his body (self ownership) and on every capital or consumer goods which 
were appropriated by voluntary exchange (contracting). (Rothbard, 1978, pp.28)  According to this 
principle, an aggression occurs whenever any person appropriates the body or the private property 
of another person without his or her consent. (Hoppe, 2010, pp.20) This is an outstanding necessary 
principle for the competition theory because, after all, competition is a transfer of ownership titles. 
So before discussing issue which implies ownership titles, we must have a theory of allocating 
ownership titles first.  
The second aspect  is a  method proposal,  in the sense that from the very  beginning the 
analytical tool to use in the monopoly theory should not contain preconceptions without relevance 
for  the  economic  science.  The  paper  will  follow  the  economic  arguments,  and  not  the  social, 
political, legal or even technical (entrepreneurial) ones. As economists, we are forced to take into 
consideration the natural state of affairs, and not the present or any legal status-quo, because only in 
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this way can we remain as neutral as possible to values. We suppose that the market is the place 
where any transactions are voluntary, determined only by the deliberate actions of individuals or 
firms, according to the principle of private property as exposed. The loss of benefits which one may 
experience after an economic action voluntarily undertaken (and on a contract-base) will not be 
deemed an infringement if the contract was observed. According to this statement, “a higher price” 
or “restricted output” will not be an infringement, firstly because there is no aggression on the 
ownership titles, and secondly because by his actions the consumer validates a certain state of the 
market.  
The third aspect is that the discussion will be a permanent parallel between the two views 
of the market, because we believe that in this way we can prove much better the qualities and errors 
of each one.  
  We  have  seen  that  the  neoclassical  monopoly  definition  incriminates  the  monopolist, 
because he will abuse of its dominant position on the market. (Kwoka & White, 2009, pp. 9)We 
thus proceed to the first fundamental question: How do we define the dominant position on the 
market? For example, the Romanian competition law points two important moments as references 
for the so-called relevant market in the case of economic concentrations
2: 
  “two or several parties involved in the economic concentration operate on the same product 
market  and  as  a  result  of  concentration  their  market  share  exceeds  15%  (horizontal 
relations)” 
  “one  or  several  involved  parties  operate  on  a  product  market  located  upstream  or 
downstream to any other market where other involved parties exist, and, additionally, their 
individual or combined market share is at least 25%, disregarding whether there is or not a 
supplier-customer relation between the parties participating in the economic concentration 
(vertical relations)” 
But what is the economic justification of these market shares? Are those simple numbers or 
it is a theory behind the regulations of the Competition Council? We can further ask if it is really a 
problem, for example, if some economic concentrations exceed the legal limits. The supplier of a 
product is not naturally conditioned by a certain market share, and that’s how the Council justifies 
its regulations. The imminence of such a situation involving a large monopoly or cartel with large 
market shares which will bring severe losses to consumers constitutes the formal justification for 
the need of government intervention. But is this really a problem? More exactly, who suffers from 
this? What is to be said with the help of economic theory? 
Also, almost all the mainstream views on competition and the regulations are describing the 
world markets as ideal states with numerous participants (atomistic view) and diversity. (Blaug, 
1992, pp. 166) But these ends can’t be put into practice by a law, but by the acceptance of the 
general public, the consumers which by their preferences determine structure modifications of the 
market and its participants. If there is any important element which should be included in any legal 
wording of the monopoly and the monopoly price, it is the consumer with his economic power.  
Given all the above mentioned, we will clarify herein below three important aspects of the 
monopoly and the monopoly price problem:  
1.  Who is the monopolist and whether is to be blamed 
2.  What is the monopoly price? 
3.  Who are the “victims” of the monopoly and how can the losses be measured? 
 
The monopolist as the greatest evil of the mainstream competition theory 
Neoclassicism argues that the monopolist is the sole seller of a good. But this definition is a 
very limited one, because one way or another, if we apply it universally, then we can consider that 
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all of us are to a certain extent, monopolists. I am the only seller of a unique work meaning that no 
other person can reproduce it precisely, thus being a different good from the good of my colleagues, 
and therefore I may be treated as a monopolist. This definition of monopoly as the unique seller of a 
certain good is not important for our purposes because it is the least problematic. (Rothbard, 2004, 
pp. 662; Stamate, 2009) Anyone can sell his goods on the market as long as there is a demand for 
them,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  incriminate  such  person  for  delivering  public  goods  to  the 
satisfaction of the consumers, on a contractual basis. Even if he would be the only seller of a good 
X,  this  situation  can’t  be  permanent,  because  high  profits  will  attract  other  sellers  from  other 
markets. (Salerno, 2005; Costea, 2006, pp.97) If a firm is the only seller of a certain good on the 
market, which in neoclassical view would be called a monopoly, it should be noted that this will be 
a monopoly strictly committed to the same forces of the market, as any other firm. The neoclassical 
theory states that any restriction on the output sold and consequently the price increase in the case 
of  a  sole  seller  of  a  unique  good  can  be  incriminated  as  a  monopoly  power  and  an  abuse  of 
dominant position. But one of the fundamental laws of economics provides that when the prices go 
up, the demand goes down. So the consumers which, according to the neoclassical theory, will be 
hurt by the actions of the monopoly will be tempted to find substitutes for the monopolized good.  
The power of the monopolist is not unlimited, because a higher price corresponds to a less 
contracted quantity (Costea, 2006, pp. 75)  
In this case, is it not inexact to suppose a long living welfare of the monopolist? (If he acts 
like a neoclassical monopolist, which means restricting the output and increasing the price) Are not 
the  economic  laws  immutable  and  universal?  We  believe  they  are,  and  the  monopoly  problem 
makes no different case; the supply and demand curves associated to the monopolist should be 
reconsidered. Neoclassical authors hold that the market should be in a permanent equilibrium (a 
situation impossible to determine on the market) and that the monopolist has a negative impact on 
this equilibrium. But 
…in judging the monopoly problem, the neoclassical theory uses as standard the perfect and 
pure competition, where in reality the entrepreneurial function disappears (Costea, 2006, pp. 
76)  
A severe critique of the perfect market in equilibrium is that it can’t explain the formation of 
prices since the equilibrium is not a realist supposition. (Rothbard, 2004, pp. 282) Moreover, it 
can’t be even named equilibrium, but more precisely a state in which at some moment t a number of 
entrepreneurs  is  to  be  found.  (Armentano,  1999,  pp.  26)  The  fact  that  the  transactions  are 
permanent, the owners of the resources are changing and so the products, confirms that we are 
dealing with a permanent resizing of the market, and in no case with an equilibrium state. As Hayek 
says  
That in conditions of real life the position even of any two producers is hardly ever the same 
is due to facts which the theory of perfect competition eliminates by its concentration on a 
long-term  equilibrium  which  in  an  ever  changing  world  can  never  be  reached”  (Hayek, 
1958, pp. 101) 
Thus the absence of this neoclassical Walrasian state of equilibrium invalidates theoretically 
and practically the monopoly concept, because it can’t be scientifically defined and explained.
3 
Monopoly is also described as a special privilege granted by the State. Murray Rothbard agrees with 
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this definition of monopoly and believes that this is the only situation in which the concept makes 
sense in theory but also in practice. Other authors deliver empirical evidences maintaining that it is  
impossible to identify even a sole example of monopoly which subsisted without official 
protection (Ballve, 1963, pp. 54) 
George Reisman mentions not only that the State is the creator of the monopoly, but that the 
forms of its existence are extremely diverse, and delivers in his treatise a detailed presentation of 
the governmental interventions which contribute to the birth and growing of a monopoly. (Reisman, 
1990, pp. 377) Because the State is by definition the territorial monopoly on coercion
4 it is quite 
clear  that  these  interventions  have  no  “competition”  since  the  State  can  always  use  force  to 
accomplish  its  tasks.  (Hoppe,  1995)  But  why  is the  State the only  entity  which  can  support  a 
monopoly? 
  We have seen that the concept of monopoly is not relevant in practice on a free market. We 
have no doubt that it can be used as a concept but the problem is its applicability. We consider that 
establishing the monopoly concept as a fundamental point for the competition theory in economic 
publications  and  moreover  incriminating  the  monopolist  on  a  legal  basis  require  rapidly  and 
efficiently a  scientific support. (Armentano, 1999, pp. 15) If  it  is not to be  found then we are 
entitled to invalidate the monopoly theory, as explained by neoclassical models. 
  We have little reasons to believe that the monopoly as described by the neoclassical theory 
can develop on a free market, because as every firm it is subject to the economic law regulation.  
This means that its actions can never be independent of the demand. The monopoly can exist in the 
sense of the first definition, but its incrimination is at least problematic if not dubious, since the 
consumer validates this state of affairs. It is the will of the consumer that puts the monopolist in 
rights. (Salerno, 2005) So we may restate that, if there is any authority which has the right and 
obligation to react in a certain way  in relation  to the  monopolist  it  is the consumer. This  is  a 
fundamental thesis of the free competition theory. To suppose that an entrepreneur or association of 
entrepreneurs can abuse of their dominant position voluntarily confirmed by the consumers is to say 
that either they are careless in relation with the demand (case in which the consumers will react), or 
that they are indifferent to the market constraints because of the stimuli created by the government 
intervention. For example, let’s suppose that an entrepreneur X is selling his product below costs, 
and thus damages his competitors
5.  After remaining the only seller of the product on the market he 
raises his price. The neoclassical theory says that the price will rise up to the point where profits 
will be maximized and the demand will remain constant. This supposition is correct but it can’t be 
universal. Not any entrepreneur, in any industry will find the perfect relation between price and 
demand in order to guarantee that his profits will be maximized. We can’t make this assumption 
because maximizing profits is the reward for the most talented entrepreneurs, those who are capable 
to correctly anticipate the uncertainty. Being the only seller of a good and increasing its price do not 
necessarily represent the condition for this reward. A higher price and restricted output may indicate 
a  greater  preference  of  the  entrepreneur  for  producing  some  other  goods,  or  for  leisure,  as  a 
consumer good. (Salerno, 2005) The problem appears where neoclassicists make this assumption: 
the abuse of dominant position means raising the price unjustifiably. But we may ask who decides 
what and how much is justified? Which are the criteria used by the neoclassical theory to determine 
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the justness or unjustness of a price? This problem is “solved” by the neoclassical theory with the 
methodology of positivist empiricism which fraudulently allows measuring the utility. (Samuelson, 
1937) According to the positivist agenda, the utility is an objective concept and can be measured 
(can take cardinal values); this will bring important outcomes on a social scale, because it can give 
the public policies the possibility to choose between one good or another to be delivered to the 
society. When an economist or public policy maker decides between the relative importance of a 
certain good and another one in the economy, he must make interpersonal comparisons of utility, 
which according to the Austrian view of the market (the theory of free competition) is impossible 
because of the very nature of utility, an ordinal concept. The neoclassicists can only speak about the 
justness of a price if they somehow know the preference scales of the consumers and entrepreneurs. 
This scale is a subjective one, and according to the subjective theory of value (a providential idea of 
the marginal revolution) no outside observer can measure the utility of a person X when acting. 
(Stamate, 2011)  From this impossibility derives the fact that no observer other than the person 
involved can make assumptions on the justness of a price or the efficiency of a policy and its 
welfare effects. In this context, the dominant position theory should be restated. The dominance of 
an entrepreneur lies in the support of the consumers, and thus it is a legitimate action.  
  Another aspect of the neoclassical monopoly theory is its systematic avoidance to apply the 
dumping  principle  in  a  situation  of  monopoly.  Almost  unexplainable,  the  dumping  problem 
disappears once the monopolist is put in his rights. Is this an economic assumption? We have no 
reason to believe so, since a free market means free entry. There are no scientific arguments for 
asserting that a new firm cannot penetrate the monopolized market.   
  The economic theory does not validate the premises of the neoclassical view of monopoly, 
and we saw why. Thus a monopolist can be at any moment outrivaled by another competitor or 
even  by  his  own  consumers  through  their  substitution  power.  But  the  State  monopoly  or  the 
monopoly granted by the State is not as harmless as the private one, which can develop on a free 
market. Taking into consideration the nature of the State, a State or State-granted monopoly can be 
only an impediment for the competition, and this is because the State can always load funds (as 
opposed to a firm which  functions on  a economic calculus or profit and  loss  basis)  and adopt 
restrictions,  for protecting  its  firms. Loading  funds (State aids and/or subsidies) to a monopoly 
means expropriating other owners of resources. Also, granting licenses or even the privilege of 
being the only seller of a good has the negative effect of preventing other firms to innovate new 
products, and on the other hand of keeping the protected firms in a state of indolence and eventually 
idleness, having no reason to compete or satisfy the needs of the consumers. A private firm can’t be 
a serious competitor to a State-owned firm because the profit and loss system of both firms is 
different. A private firm can’t permanently load funds in order to face the competition of the State.   
  A classical way that the State uses to create monopolies is for example the commercial 
policies field. The protectionism creates monopoly power. By protecting a domestic producer, this 
one is offered a monopolistic privilege to the detriment of his competition. (Reisman, 1990, pp. 
380) But it is interesting that even when the protection is not granted to a sole producer, by simply 
imposing tariff and non-tariff barriers, the monopolistic privileges are put in place. Those who have 
imported a certain product for an n sum of money, are now restricted because they can’t afford to 
import the same quantity or any quantity at all. It is very likely that the tariffs will not demotivate 
all  the  imports,  but  this  is  not  the  problem.  What  is  important  is  that  for  some  categories  of 
importers this activity becomes either very expensive or completely disappears, thus creating an 
incentive for the domestic producers to raise the price. If we consider the theory of free competition, 
we  may  say  that  imposing  a  tariff  unnaturally  determines  the  exit  of  some  competitive  firms, 
leaving their consumers with a more scarce and expensive product or even without it.  
  We are entitled to say that the only situation in which the neoclassical monopoly theory 
remains relevant is the monopoly granted by the State. Only starting from the principles of free 
market,  private  property  and  non-aggression  can  we  imagine  a  private  monopoly  with  the Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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neoclassical effects that have been stipulated.  
The only situation when monopoly makes sense is when aggression enters the scene (the 
government  protects  the  monopoly  through  different  forms  of  protection,  for  example 
licensing, copyright, patents and commercial protectionism) (Reisman, 1990, pp. 388) 
Government interventions creating monopoly are to be found also in the monetary field (where the 
central banks exerts a monopoly power on coinage), national security (secret services and police), 
defense field (the army), roads, transports etc. Each of these industries is offering a public good, and 
thus enters under the incidence of the same monopoly theory. Can we consider those who offer 
these services as monopolists? The answer is yes, of course, for two reasons: one reason concerns 
the aggressive manner in which they appropriate ownership titles and the other reason according to 
which the competition to their detriment is strictly forbidden by law.  
If  the  monopoly  should  be  forbidden  why  limit  this  to  the  private  producers  and  not 
eliminate the coercive monopoly of the central bank or the monopoly on the use of violence, 
which defines the state
6 (Costea, 2006, pp. 100) 
A third definition of monopoly, and maybe the most debated, states that a monopoly is in charge 
whenever the firm is selling at a monopoly price. This opens a new problem, that of defining the 
monopoly price. 
What exactly is the monopoly price? 
The  monopoly price  is what the  neoclassical  monopoly theory  has to prove  in practice. 
Because  
 
The  economic  identification  of  the  monopoly  price  is  a  necessary  condition,  but  not 
sufficient for the relevance in law of this concept (Costea, 2006, pp. 100) 
 
Thus, we see that the neoclassical monopoly theory needs a strong support for the monopoly 
price  concept,  so  as  to  be  scientifically  valid  and  also  is a  part  of  the  support theories  which 
legitimate the government intervention on the market.  
Neoclassicism states that the monopoly price would result from a reduction (unnecessary) in 
the output sold. The entrepreneur holds an X stock of a good and a monopoly position (it is the only 
seller of that good), and chooses to sell a (X-1) quantity after a long period of selling X. Having 
monopoly power and controlling the entire resource which is needed for producing the good, the 
entrepreneur  can  increase  the  price  by  selling  less  of  that  good.  And  this  would  be  an unjust 
situation for the consumer, because this one would have less to buy. But this is a very questionable 
assumption. As we have seen, it is possible that the preference of the entrepreneur for leisure or for 
creating another product has taken the place of the present monopolized product. Also it is very 
possible that a clear distinction between the monopoly price and the competitive or market price 
may not be made. (Rothbard, 2004, pp. 672; Salerno, 2010) The monopolist can’t know a priori 
what is the maximum price for his product but only from empirical observations, which is not 
sufficient  to  establish  a  concept  of  maximizing  profits  and  much  less  a  monopoly  profit.  The 
monopoly price can’t be scientifically determined because the entrepreneurial process of making 
profits is a gambling game, and it is inappropriate for the economists to deliver a theory which 
pretends to have discovered the limits of justness and unjustness of entrepreneurs’ actions on the 
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market. The economic theory of free competition firmly states that the only authority possessing 
such a theory is the consumer.  
If  the  superior  price  is  a  consequence  of  output  restriction,  what  relevance  would  have 
anymore the historical information collected through the exploratory method, as a matter of 
fact practiced by any entrepreneur? They reveal only past terms of trade, opened to historical 
interpretation, but without delivering firm information regarding future prices and much less 
those  which  would  have  been  existed.  We  judge  that,  although  the  two  conditions  of 
emerging monopoly price have their own theoretical and practical relevance on the market, 
they  are  not  mutually  sustainable,  and  their  simultaneous  application  does  not  help  to 
differentiate on the free market between the market price and monopoly price (Costea, 2006, 
pp. 94)  
Neoclassicism does not have a consistent and coherent theory of monopoly price. Neither in 
theory nor in practice have we had clear proofs. And we believe that the necessity of having a 
correct theory before incriminating the entrepreneurs’ actions on the market is unquestionable.   
Who are the monopoly “victims”? 
Neoclassical monopoly theory along with the competition laws of the governments around 
the world agrees that the consumer is the supposed victim of the monopoly. (Pelkmans, 2003, pp. 
228) But at this stage, we should make a clear distinction between the private monopoly which can 
evolve on a free market and the State or State-granted monopoly which can evolve on a regulated 
market. 
  If  we  suppose  its  conceptual  existence,  the  private  monopoly  is  a  firm  like  any  other, 
dependent upon the consumer preferences, and we can’t bring a lawsuit against it for its simple 
existence  because  it  does  not  infringe  the  private  property  rights.  An  aggression  is  when  an 
entrepreneur  forces  his  consumers  to  buy  his  products  against  their  will.  If  the  consumers 
voluntarily  buy  the  product,  according  to the  economic  theory  of  free  competition  there  is  no 
aggression. A law against the monopoly price and the monopolist itself must be based on a clear 
aggression and consumer’s harm. It is true that the monopolist price may be a prohibitive one, but 
this would not be a satisfactory situation for the monopolist because the demand will fall. Also, it is 
needless to say that as a principle the consumer, as buyer, will always want lower prices or even no 
prices, and the seller higher prices. Given this, it is difficult to formulate a theory of the “perfect 
price” for both the consumer and the seller. Economic science does not deal with the perfect, just or 
unjust prices but with the  market prices,  voluntarily agreed on the  market between  buyers and 
sellers. Thus we can’t argue that a private monopoly would harm the consumers.  
And to prove the harm suffered by the consumer, we must first of all identify quantitatively 
the utility of the good; however we have already stated that utility is not a cardinal measure but an 
ordinal one. This brings us to the conclusion that a prospect private monopoly would be inoffensive 
and it would always be in danger because of other pretenders. The only thing left to say is that if 
they feel under-privileged, the consumers have two solutions: the substitution (a difficult option if 
the demand is elastic) and the boycott. Both solutions bring losses to the monopolist, which, in case 
of mismatching will leave the place for some other competitors. At the same time, it has to be 
mentioned that  
passive agreement of a high price, without hostilities on the part of the consumer, proves 
that  there  is  no  dissatisfaction  among  them,  and  if  the  transaction  is  being  made,  the 
exchange price at that moment is the best possible price, it is the market price
7 (Stamate, 
2009) 
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The case of the State or State-granted monopoly is different. Being based on coercion, a 
State  monopoly  has  truly  a  long  living  life  than  a  private  one.  State  monopoly  can  change 
negatively the consumer preferences and their substitution rate. The ways to access the substitution 
products are much more troublesome. State monopoly is a long-lasting project because it is based 
on coercion, and has much more possibilities to change the demand structure and the incentives. A 
State-protected firm, although  it  is not functioning with public capital, can always abuse of  its 
position on the market because the competition is kept away. In many cases, the State does not have 
an express intention to create or support monopolies but this is not necessary. Because it possesses 
the territorial monopoly on aggression and coercion, it is clear that anything with its stamp is a 
monopoly itself. The very difference between a State monopoly and private monopoly is that the 
former has a perennial nature and the latter an ephemeral one.  
Final conclusions 
  This paper gives a clue for the correct interpretation of free competition theory, a product 
developed  by  the  Austrian  School  of  economics  and  a  serious  competitor  for  the  mainstream 
(neoclassical) theory of competition. The case of the neoclassical monopoly theory needs a review. 
There  are  not  sufficient  reasons  to  believe  that  the  concepts  of  monopoly,  abuse  of  dominant 
position and monopoly price have profound theoretical backgrounds. As long as the monopoly price 
can’t  be  scientifically  proved,  the  entire  monopoly  theory  is  in  serious  question  regarding  its 
analytical and legal relevance. This is the first major critique of the present paper. For implementing 
the concept of monopoly in positive law and thus to be able further to create competition policies, a 
“severe” condition must be fulfilled: the monopoly concept must be operational. Conceptual realism 
– which can be found in assumptions like the monopoly price, equilibrium and continuity – may be 
a good premise  for  ideal States but  in reality  we need operational  concepts. This  is the  major 
problem of the monopoly theory and also of the general theory of perfect and pure competition. We 
can argue and agree with the fact that the whole equilibrium paradigm which penetrated economic 
science  through  the  tremendous  influence  of  Léon  Walras,  it  is  useful  as  analytical  tool  to 
understand the objective reality, but it is inappropriate when the reality itself is equilibrium.  
  Another important aspect which the present paper tried to reach is the indisputable fact that 
there is no consensus among theorists regarding the monopoly and competition issues. As could be 
seen  in  the  argumentation,  two  different  schools  of  thought  dedicated  their  theories  to  the 
competition field (neoclassical and Austrian). But if both of them hold the same purposes when 
describing  the  goodness  and  badness  of  competition,  then  we  can  be  sure  that  they  can’t  be 
simultaneously right. Thus only one can be a “candidate” for the position of truthfulness.   
  The only circumstance in which the monopoly theory (along with its associated theories 
regarding  the  excess  capacity,  social  loss,  misallocation  etc.)  is  valid  is  in  the  field  of  State 
monopolies. Either owned by the State or only granted, these monopolies meet all the conditions 
stipulated by the neoclassical paradigm. Here we explained the fundamental difference between free 
competition theory and neoclassical competition theory and we argued that under the neoclassical 
assumptions only the State-owned or State-granted monopolies can be considered as having harmful 
effects on consumers. The market imperfections - the name given by the neoclassical theory to any 
market form which does not fulfill the conditions of perfect competition model – become true only 
when on the market it is instituted a compulsory monopoly on force and coercion. On a free market, 
no  compulsory  monopoly  can  develop  if  the  consumer  does  not  support  it.  Therefore,  we  can 
conceptually  imagine  a  private  monopoly  but  not  independent  of  consumer  demand  and 
preferences. Free competition theory takes into account the possibility of a private monopoly on the 
market but as a temporarily state and voluntarily accepted by the consumers.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
only prove that this self-same super-monopolist was indeed providing consumers with the most urgently wanted goods and services 
in the most efficient way” (Hoppe, 1990, p. 213) Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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  As a final conclusion of the paper, we must emphasize that, as economists, we have the duty 
to search for all possible alternative competition theories, for it is the economist views those which 
legitimize the economic policies. Moreover, the plea for alternative theories is crucial when the 
mainstream ones fail to correctly explain the economic phenomena.  
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